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ABSTRACT 
Purpose. To study basic principles and conditions of the efficiency of the system to redistribute mineral extraction 
revenue including the countries with lower levels of welfare. 
Methods. The research applies a method of qualitative and quantitative analysis of the scientific literature, data by 
the Natural Resource Governance Institute, national reports according to the Extractive Industries Transparency Ini-
tiative, and open Internet sources. Taxation schemes for mineral extraction revenue as well as the most important 
tendencies in the schemes changes over the recent years were considered. Distributions of the resource taxes in terms 
of the state administration levels as well as vertical distribution of budget receipts from the development of natural 
resources were analyzed. The countries distributing tax receipts from the mineral extraction in favour of the local 
authorities were selected as the object of the research. 
Findings. It has been determined that in the majority of countries, payments from mineral extraction are sent to the 
national-level institutions being distributed back to the mining areas or neighbouring territories. It has been pointed 
out that certain countries send a share of the mining income to the local budgets automatically using the formulas 
based on the objective indicators such as amount of population, amount of budget receipts from the area, poverty rate 
or geographical position. It has been identified that the basic principle of the system of resource use taxation to pro-
vide social welfare is represented by the optimal taxation scheme stimulating the production and maximizing the 
income which share is redistributed in favour of the society to cover all the local administration levels. 
Originality. The comparative analysis and determination of the recent data of distribution of budget receipts from 
mineral resources in terms of the developing countries. 
Practical implications. The obtained results may favour the scientific substantiation of the strategy to distribute 
mineral extraction revenue, planning of the development of mineral and raw material complex of the Central Asian 
countries; moreover, they may be useful while assessing the efficiency of investment projects of the field development. 
Keywords: mineral resources, taxation, extractive industries transparency, distribution of taxes, budget receipts 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the majority of countries where leaders in the de-
velopment of natural resources are represented by state 
companies (Saudi Aramco, Saudi Arabia; ADNOC, 
UAE; Equinor/Statoil, Norway etc.), land and its mine-
rals belong to the state (they are publicly owned). Certain 
political forces (state government, ruling political parties) 
and business-groups (co-owners of mining companies) 
use that fact as the key argument of the issue that the 
natural resource revenue is distributed in the interests of 
the country and the whole society. However, even lea-
ding role of the state in redistribution of that revenue 
does not protect it from its privatization by specific social 
groups. Nevertheless, some countries have managed to 
solve the problem successfully. For instance, state oil 
companies of Kuwait and Yemen are owned by the ru-
ling dynasties; however, as a result of natural resources 
redistribution, the countries could provide high living 
standards and social protection for their population and 
develop sustainable infrastructure (Couttenier & 
Sangnier, 2015). Norway, the United Kingdom, the USA 
and other countries accumulate and redistribute conside-
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rable amount of the revenue not only for the national 
needs but also for the development of social sphere and 
internal investments (Hinojosa, Bebbington, Barrientos, & 
Addison, 2010). Though, in Venezuela, state monopoly 
for oil extraction has not eliminated overall poverty yet. 
Natural resources play a dominating social, econo-
mic, and political role in 81 countries which cover a 
quarter of the world gross domestic product (GDP) and 
half of the world population (The World Bank Group, 
2019). Taking into consideration that fact, transparency 
of the operations in mining industries is of special im-
portance in the context of reporting to state agencies, 
high administration standards, and sustainable economic 
development (Piwniak, Bondarenko, Salli, Pavlenko, & 
Dychkovskiy, 2007). 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is 
one of the mechanisms favouring the transparency in-
crease (Moses, Houqe, & van Zijl, 2018). The countries, 
which have undertaken obligations to implement EITI 
standard, issue reports on the payments by mining com-
panies to the state as well as on the payments declared by 
the state as the ones sent to the state budget. Thus, the 
process may be controlled by different interested parties – 
state agencies, civil society, and company representatives.  
According to the Initiative standard, citizens have an 
access to the information on tax and non-tax payments of 
the mining companies; that helps control their activity. 
Along with that, it favours positive investment climate 
taking into account the fact that transparency of that 
sector of economy allows investors reducing their risks 
to be sure in clear regulations while making decisions 
concerning the start of investments (Corrigan, 2017). 
Mineral extraction revenue is distributed at the ex-
pense of taxation. Schemes for the taxation of extracted 
mineral resources depend upon the industry where a 
subsoil user operates, volume of the prospected minerals, 
and additional (specific) risks (Saik, Petlovanyi, Lozyn-
skyi, Sai, & Merzlikin, 2018). While determining the 
amount of natural and resource rent, we should take into 
account the volume of revenue and costs for the devel-
opment and extraction as well as the index of normal 
profit of an investor considering reasonably estimated 
risks (Daniel, Keen, & McPherson, 2010). 
Specific risks of the mining industry involve: long-
term period of geological prospecting and other explora-
tory operations; considerable volume of the initial irre-
versible investments into the deposit (since specific 
equipment aimed for the deposit will never be used 
again); uncertainty as for the future positive monetary 
flow from the raw material sell due to high volatility and 
unpredictability of prices; long-term period of operation 
below the breakeven point; possible negative effect of 
changes in political or environmental media; and con-
siderable costs during the deposit development closure 
(Otto et al., 2006). 
Taxation schemes vary considerably in the context of 
national risk components (political, sovereign, and legis-
lative). Since the rate of normal profitability for some 
deposit investment project is higher for the country with 
high assessed risks, taxation scheme should offer addi-
tional tax benefits or reductions to compensate excess 
risks. At the same time, it is a widely used practice to 
apply increased royalty or tax rates for highly profitable 
deposits (Christmann & Stolojan, 2001). 
Optimal ratio of fiscal tools depends upon the possi-
bilities and preferences offered by a specific country. 
Thus, taxation tools oriented to the extraction volume are 
convenient in terms of administration and provide stable 
budget receipts (Arabian countries, Mexico, some USA 
states). At the same time, they transfer key risks of the 
project implementation onto a subsoil user; as a response 
to that action, government reduces overall tax burden 
(Corporate income taxes…, 2012). 
Other countries (Norway, France, Great Britain) ap-
ply more progressive taxation scheme (being oriented to 
the amount of income) by shifting the burden of risks to 
the state; in this case, comparatively high tax rate acts as 
a compensator (Land, 2010). 
Apart from the general approach to the applied taxa-
tion scheme, certain external factors influence the selec-
tion of fiscal tools: overall economic dynamics (increase, 
recession, stagnation); extraordinary events changing 
ecological balance (natural disasters, technogenic acci-
dents, catastrophes). Taking into consideration a multi-
variance of the approaches to the selection of certain 
taxation scheme, it is essential to analyze the evolution of 
approaches and schemes of mineral extraction taxation. 
2. TENDENCIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
PRACTICE IN TERMS OF MINERAL 
EXTRACTION TAXATION 
While generalizing international practice in the sphere 
of mineral extraction taxation, important tendencies being 
observed for the recent years should be analyzed: 
1. Intensification of the international competitiveness 
(including tax one): gradual unbalanced recovery of the 
world economy after the 2008 – 2009 crisis has resumed 
the competitiveness for the potential investors between 
the developed countries and the ones with developing 
markets. Systematic decrease in the corporate income tax 
rate is one of the manifestations of that process. In terms of 
the countries rich in natural resources (Indonesia, Malay-
sia, Nigeria etc.), the mentioned tendency is accompanied 
by the reconsideration of the rates by means of special 
fiscal tools: royalty and rent taxes towards their growth 
which makes it possible to keep the budget in relatively 
balanced conditions (Issabayev & Rizvanoghlu, 2019). 
2. Price rise in the world commodity markets in post-
crisis period has allowed numerous countries (Columbia, 
Gabon etc.) increasing ad valorem rates as royalty as 
well as the royalty for the volume of the extracted raw 
material. Unequal price rise stipulates further differentia-
tion of the tax rates and royalty depending upon the mi-
neral type (Hogan, 2008). 
3. Under conditions of the economic growth and in-
creased demand for mineral resources, countries with the 
developing markets (Brazil, Ghana, Indonesia etc.) use 
special fiscal tools as a key source of income. In this 
context, amount of tax incomes outsprips the economy-
wide dynamics (Parcero & Papyrakis, 2016). 
Developed countries (the USA, Canada) try to reduce 
negative impact of the taxation of mineral extraction 
revenue by intensifying stimulating functions of univer-
sal fiscal tools (i.e. income tax), increasing neutrality of 
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special fiscal tools (excess profit tax, royalty for income), 
and intensifying transparency of the process of tax pay-
ment by subsoil users and their administration by the 
authorized taxation bodies.  
4. Beginning from 2010, popularity of the mixed ta-
xation scheme (taking into account the extracted raw 
material and project profitability) is growing that makes 
it possible to minimize risks of state fiscal losses and 
risks of project attractiveness decrease due to the exces-
sive taxation for an investor (Denmark, Norway, the 
Netherlands). Moreover, in federative countries (the 
USA, Canada), rent taxes become increasingly the reve-
nue source not for central government but for local 
communities; thus, those payments become target ones 
(Van Alstine & Barkemeyer, 2014). 
5. For the recent decade, a divergence between the 
developed countries and the countries with the develo-
ping markets has been intensified as for objectives of 
mineral extraction taxation. Necessity in the additional 
financial resources for the budget of the countries with 
developing markets is the main problem of the “short-
sightedness” of taxation policy and cause of using up 
mineral extraction profit that explains fiscal orientation 
of the mining taxation system in such countries (Va-
gonova & Volosheniuk, 2012). 
Enforcement of the rights for future generations as 
the main long-term non-fiscal taxation objective in the 
developed countries explains target nature of the mineral 
extraction revenue sent to so-called “wealth funds” (Hil-
son, 2012). Table 1 represents a list of the most im-
portant funds of that kind. 
Thus, in terms of modern economic processes, a 
problem of fair and efficient distribution of mineral ex-
traction revenue is of special importance. 
Table 1. International stabilization funds formed at the expense of financial deductions from mineral extraction, at the end of 
2016 (in the order of assets decreasing) (Sovereign wealth fund, 2019) 
Country Fund name Assets, bln USD Resource 
State 
Norway State Pension Fund – Global 1002.0 Oil 
Kuweit Kuwait Investment Authority 642.0 Oil 
Saudi Arabia SAMA Foreign Holdings 514.0 Oil 
Qatar  Qatar Investment Authority 320.0 Oil 
Saudi Arabia Public Investment Fund 183.0 Oil 
Iran National Development Fund 91.0 Oil 
Russia Russian National Wealth Fund 76.3 Oil 
Kazakhstan  Kazakhstan National Fund 64.7 Oil 
Brunei Brunei Investment Agency 40.0 Oil 
the UAE (federal) Investment Fund 34.0 Oil 
Azerbaijan  State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan 33.1 Oil 
Oman State General Reserve Fund 18.0 Gas 
Eastern Timor  Petroleum Fund of Timor-Leste 16.6 Gas 
Chile  Economic and Social Stabilization Fund 14.7 Copper 
Algeria Revenue Regulation Fund 7.6 Oil 
Oman Oman Investment Fund 6.0 Oil 
Mexico Oil Revenues Stabilization Fund of Mexico 6.0 Oil 
Botswana Pula Fund 5.7 Diamonds and minerals 
Angola Fundo Soberano de Angola 4.6 Oil 
Columbia Colombia Savings and Stabilization Fund 3.5 Oil and ore 
Kazakhstan National Investment Corporation 2.0 Oil 
Nigeria Nigeria Sovereign Investment Authority 1.4 Oil 
Iraq Development Fund for Iraq 0.9 Oil 
Venezuela FEM – Macroeconomic Stabilization Fund 0.8 Oil 
Ghana Ghana Petroleum Funds 0.45 Oil 
Gabon  Sovereign Fund of the Gabonese Republic 0.4 Oil 
Mongolia Fiscal Stability Fund 0.3 All minerals 
Mauritania  National Fund for Hydrocarbon Reserves 0.3 Gas 
Regional 
The UAE, Abu-Dhabi  Abu-Dhabi Investment Authority 828.0 Oil 
The UAE, Dubai Investment Corporation of Dubai 209.5 Oil 
The UAE, Abu-Dhabi Mubadala Investment Company 125.0 Oil 
The UAE, Abu-Dhabi Abu-Dhabi Investment Council 110.0 Oil 
The USA, Alaska Alaska Permanent Fund 64.9 Oil 
Canada, Alberta Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund 13.4 Oil 
The USA, Wyoming  Permanent Wyoming Mineral Trust Fund 7.3 All minerals 
The USA, Northern Dakota  North Dakota Legacy Fund 4.3 Gas 
The USA, Alabama  Alabama Trust Fund 2.7 Gas 
The USA, Utah Utah-SITFO 2.0 Minerals  
The USA, Idaho  Idaho Endowment Fund Investment Board 2.0 Minerals 
The USA, Louisiana  Louisiana Education Quality Trust Fund 1.3 Gas 
Australia, Western Australia Western Australian Future Fund 0.3 All minerals 
V. Churin, N. Vysotskaya, Yu. Sizova, E. Danilina, D. Gorelov. (2019). Mining of Mineral Deposits, 13(2), 66-74 
 
69 
3. MODEL OF VERTICAL 
DISTRIBUTION OF TAX RECEIPTS 
FROM THE MINING INDUSTRIES 
Speaking about the distribution of tax receipts from 
the mining industries, it should be noted that despite 
different fiscal systems, many countries with high re-
source potential have developed methods to distribute 
local tax revenues. In the majority of cases, they mean 
lowered level of the government interference into the 
local budget administration and empowerment of the 
local authorities with the possibility to use rent payment 
and other revenues in the most efficient way – to satisfy 
the needs of local communities. Similar model of budget 
income distribution among all the levels of administra-
tion is known as a model of vertical distribution. 
Following countries are among the ones which dis-
tribute tax revenues from the mining industries for the 
account of local authorities: Brazil, Ghana, Indonesia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, China, Mongolia, the Philip-
pines etc. Governments of those countries distribute 
budget revenues among all the local administration levels 
(vertical distribution) (Otto, 2000). Table 2 represents 
distribution of mineral taxes according to the levels of 
state administration. In Table 2 other sources of income, 
such as sales tax, dividends, and license payments are not 
included into the table. 
Table 3 represents vertical distribution of budget re-
venues from the natural resources in the developing 
countries which distribute tax revenues from the mining 
industries for the account of local authorities. 
Data of the tables show that in terms of the most 
countries, payments from mineral mining comes to the 
national-level institutions; however, they are distributed 
back to the mining areas and neighbouring territories. In 
this context, some countries (Brazil, Indonesia, the Phi-
lippines, Mongolia, Kyrgyzstan) send a share of revenues 
from mining to local budgets automatically using formu-
las based upon the objective indicators such as the 
amount of population, amount of budget receipts from 
the territories, poverty rate or geographical position. 
Table 2. Distribution of mineral taxes according to the levels 
of state administration (Natural resource revenue 
sharing, 2016) 
Country State structure 
Co
rpo
rat
e 
inc
om
e t
ax
 
Ro
ya
lty
 
Pro
pe
rty
/ 
lan
d t
ax
 
N S N S N S 
Argentine Federal ×   ×  ×
Australia Federal ×  ×* × ×* ×
Brazil Federal ×  ×  ×  
Canada  Federal × × ×* × ×* × 
Chile Unitary ×    ×  
Chine Regionalized unitary ×  ×  ×  
Congo  Unitary ×   ×  × 
Ghana Unitary ×  ×  ×  
India Federal ×   ×  ×
Indonesia Regionalized unitary ×  ×  × ×
Kazakhstan Unitary ×   ×  ×
Kyrgyzstan  Unitary ×  ×   ×
Mexico Federal ×  ×  ×  
Mongolia Unitary ×   ×  ×
Myanmar  Unitary ×  ×  × ×
Peru Unitary ×  × ×  ×
the Philippines Regionalized unitary × × × ×**  ×
Russia Federal × × ×   ×
Southern Africa Unitary ×  ×   ×
Tanzania Regionalized unitary ×  ×   ×
the UAE Federal  ×  ×  ×
Great Britain Regionalized unitary ×      
the USA Federal × × × ×*  × 
Note: 
N – national government; 
S – sub-national administration (state, province, regional or 
municipal); 
* – applied only within the territory of federal administration; 
** – royalty are charged and excised only by the groups of 
indigenous community and some local authorities. 
For instance, in Mongolia, most revenues from min-
ing and oil sector are centralized; however, separate 
development funds operate for each city, town or region. 
Table 3. Vertical distribution of budget revenues from natural resources in the developing countries (Natural resource revenue 
sharing, 2016) 
Country Resource Revenue stream National government
Governing bodies in 
the mining territories
Municipal/district governments
producing non-producing
Brazil 
Oil (apart from off-shore) Rent 12.6% 52.5% 26.2% 8.7% 
Oil (apart from off-shore) Special participa-tion (some fields) 50.0% 40.0% 10% 0% 
Ghana Minerals Royalties 91.0% — 9% 0% 
Indonesia 
Oil All 84.5% 3.1% 6.2% 6.2% 
Gas All 69.5% 6.1% 12.2% 12.2% 
Minerals Royalties 20.0% 16.0% 32% 32% 
The Philippines  Minerals All 60.0% 8.0% 18% municipality; 14% barangay 0% 
 
In 2016, the Local Development Fund (LDF) was es-
tablished there; the Fund received royalty from the mi-
ning industry as well as the payments for issuing mining 
licenses from the corresponding regions. At the same 
time, at the level with the representatives of administrate 
units, the LDF is responsible for making decisions con-
cerning the funds administration. 
Slightly different situation is observed in Kazakhstan 
where tax revenue from oil sector is administered by the 
National Fund while tax payments from the mining in-
dustry are controlled by national and local state institu-
tions without any special procedures. 
Kyrgyzstan also distributes financial revenues from 
the mining industries between national and local budgets. 
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However, apart from standard taxes from mining activity, 
local authorities also obtain a package of social benefits; 
in some cases, company may offer local communities 
additional compensations including monetary payments. 
Alaska has managed to harmonize versatile interests 
of the center and regions as well as business-structures 
and regional community. The experience is considered to 
be unique since a particular region of the country has 
managed to provide rather high level of common wealth 
mostly owing to the well-balanced and reasonable social 
and economic rent policy. 
Corresponding system of the mineral use taxation is 
the important constituent of the mechanism to provide 
social welfare as a result of income redistribution. 
There are following taxes at the territory of the state 
(Alaska’s oil and gas…, 2012): 
– mineral extraction tax – net profit from the extrac-
tion is subject to tax at the rate of 15% (in 2014, the tax 
reached 75% according to the progressive scale). The tax 
provides about 88% of the state income from the oil and 
gas extraction;  
– royalty (compensation payment of the state for the 
right of natural resources ownership) – in the majority of 
cases, there is the rate of 12.5%; 
– property tax is 2% from the value of the property 
required for the field development; corporate tax is 9.4%; 
environmental pollution charge during oil extraction is 
USD 0.05 for each barrel. 
Major share of the tax payments is sent to the state 
budget (Common fund) to cover government expendi-
tures. At the same time, 25 – 50% of the funds received 
owing to the resources taxation are sent to the specially 
established fund (Alaska Permanent Fund). 
Basic principle of the taxation policy in terms of the 
income of the resource sectors of the economy is in the 
establishment of optimal rent climate which both stimu-
lates the production and maximizes the income paid to 
the government (in the form of taxes). 
In general, practice of the redistribution of rent in-
come in the state of Alaska has its advantages and disad-
vantages (Bazaleva & Kaznacheev, 2015). 
Advantages include the establishment and efficient 
functioning of the special fund – Alaska Permanent Fund 
and the Constitutional Budget Reserve Fund. It was the 
establishment of those two Funds that made it possible to 
solve the problem of surplus profit redistribution (i.e. 
natural resource rent), accumulation of funds, and effi-
cient management of the accrued capital.  
Disadvantages of the practice demonstrated by Alas-
ka are in the development of maximally favourable tax 
scheme for enterprises (mostly, oil ones) which are tight-
ly connected with the government. As a result, there are 
certain agreements between legislative power of the state 
and oil industry in favour of the latter. 
Thus, the state of Alaska demonstrates economic and 
social efficiency of the system of natural resource rent 
receipt and use along with the unclear specification of the 
ownership rights with the following rent diffusion. 
Below, there are examples of the developing coun-
tries when budget receipts obtained at the central level 
may be received locally within the areas they originate 
from or the neighbouring territories. 
4. DISTRIBUTION OF THE MINERAL 
EXTRACTION REVENUE IN TERMS 
OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
4.1. Kazakhstan 
In Kazakhstan, different institutions are responsible 
for tax administration. Kazakhstan National Fund regu-
lates budget receipts from oil and gas sectors. In fact, that 
institution accumulates direct tax payments from the oil 
and gas sector; the payments account for 72.6% of the 
total state budget receipts (Natsional’nyy otchet…, 
2017). In particular, the National Fund is established to 
ensure oil-selling revenues and balance national and 
regional budgets. Both the government and executive 
municipal bodies administrate budget receipts from the 
mining industry. 
Reports on the expenditures of the National Fund as 
well as national and local budgets are published by the 
Ministry of Finances in statistic bulletins. Despite the 
fact that the government publishes the information on 
those financial operations, details concerning the formu-
las to calculate budget receipts distribution are not re-
vealed. Moreover, changes are being constantly intro-
duced into the tax rates. For instance, in 2011, mineral 
extraction tax was 7%; however, in 2014, it was reduced 
down to 5%. Basic local taxes paid by the subsoil users 
are as follows: emission tax, tax for the corporate vehi-
cles, property tax, social tax, and land tax. 
According to the report by the EITI of Kazakhstan 
(Natsional’nyy otchet…, 2017), in 2017, KZT 38.7 bln 
(USD 283 mln) were allocated for social and economic 
development of the regions by the subsoil users from oil 
and gas as well as mining industries; in this context, only 
oil and gas enterprises paid KZT 27.4 bln being almost 
USD 151 mln (71% of the total amount). For instance, in 
2017, Tengizchevroil – joint venture of Chevron, Ex-
xonMobil, KazMunayGas, and LukArco paid out more 
than USD 372 mln to the local budgets. 
4.2. Kyrgyzstan 
According to the report by the EITI of Kyrgyzstan 
(Otchet Kyrgyzskoy Respubliki…, 2015), in 2014, mi-
ning industry covered 8.4% of GDP. Moreover, in 2014, 
40% of total export and 17% of total tax budget receipts 
accounted for mining industry. 
According to the changes stipulated by the local 
government reform in 2012, authority and indepen-
dence of local government bodies have increased con-
siderably. In addition, new legislation on the distribu-
tion of budget receipts from the natural resources, 
adopted in 2013, has resulted in greater local financial 
receipts from the activities of mining enterprises. In 
2014, the Regional Development Fund was established 
to develop local infrastructure and support different 
social and economic programmes. 
Kyrgyzstan is divided into the regions consisting of 
districts; the districts are subdivided into communities 
(auls-aimaks). State budget functions at two levels: at the 
national level and at the level of auls-aimaks; due to that 
fact, they have their considerable responsibilities in terms 
of the expenses. 
National budget receives income tax, VAT, rent 
payment, bonuses, excises, customs duties, administra-
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tive fines, and state capital dividends. Taxes being sent 
automatically to the local territories include land and 
property taxes, administrative fines, and budget receipts 
from the municipal property administration. All the auls-
aimaks receive 50% of the income tax from the selling in 
terms of inter-budgetary transfers. In addition, auls-
aimaks, within which territory mining enterprises oper-
ate, receive 50% of rent payment from the mineral ex-
traction (except gold, oil, and gas), 3% of the licensure 
payment, and 3% of the auction payments (Otchet Kyr-
gyzskoy Respubliki…, 2015). 
In addition, companies operating within the regions 
with rich resources, pay 2% rent payment known as the 
“payment for the development and support of local infra-
structures”. That payment is distributed among certain 
auls-aimaks (20%) and national budget (80%) for further 
distribution among other auls-aimaks through the Re-
gional Development Fund. In its turn, corresponding 
fund is divided into smaller funds in terms of regions and 
districts to support projects aimed at the development of 
communities. As a rule, objectives of those payments are 
to help the communities with economic progress and 
development of local infrastructure. Auls-aimaks rich in 
mineral resources and located within the territory of 
mining regions are given certain social support; in some 
cases, companies may offer local communities additional 
compensations including monetary benefits. 
4.3. Mongolia 
Mongolia is considered a significant world producer 
of gold, copper, and coal. 16.7% of GDP is accounted for 
the mining industry. Major share of the revenues from 
mining and oil sector is centralized. In particular, gov-
ernment of the country receives rent payments from the 
mineral extraction and company income tax. Authorities 
of the regions and districts (aimaks) receive funds 
through the Common Local Development Fund (CLDF). 
The CLDF gets financing owing to the redistribution of 
the share of state budget income to support and provide 
sustainable local development. According to the report 
by the EITI of Mongolia, the Fund has several sources of 
income, i.e.:  
– 5% of total VAT amount for goods and services 
(except the import); 
– 5% of rent payment from the mineral extraction; 
– grants and financial foreign aid to support local  
development; 
– transfers from the lower-level budgets to the upper-
level budgets as well as 30% of rent payment from the oil 
sector (Mongolia twelfth EITI Report, 2018). 
Besides, there are certain funds for the development 
of each town, city, region etc. It should be noted that 
local development funds receive finances allocated from 
the CLDF, additional revenues (accumulated at the ex-
pense of tax increase and cost saving), grants and dona-
tions from foreign funders, 10% of the fund balance after 
rent payments transferring from the entities dealing with 
state projects implementation, and 50% of the payment 
for the licensure for exploration and development of 
mineral resources. Moreover, local authorities are in-
volved in issuing the licensure – they are consulted with 
while issuing the licenses for mining activity. 
According to the EITI of Mongolia in 2017, local de-
velopment funds received the income of MNT 105.9 bln 
(USD 53 mln) including 70.4% of VAT (rate of 25%), 
18.2% of the payment for mineral extraction licensure 
(rate of 5%), and 5.9% of VAT for oil extraction (rate of 
30%) (Mongolia twelfth EITI Report, 2018). 
Nevertheless, the approach is characterized by several 
disadvantages. In particular, the available system of dis-
tribution basing upon the amount of population has re-
sulted in much higher level of funds allocation for the 
capital which is also considered to be the richest region. 
In addition, the country has the Fund of Human  
Potential Development aimed at the accumulation of 
savings and additional reserves from the mining sector. 
The Fund has following sources of income (Mongolia 
twelfth EITI Report, 2018):  
– dividends from the sale of the government stock of 
entities which have mining licenses; 
– 65% of rent payments from the entities which  
extract mineral resources; 
– net profit from the investments into the Fund. 
4.4. China 
Resource tax being a part of Chinese tax system and 
being collected from the subsoil users (Kuklina, Chzhu 
Syaotsin, Sun’ Yuysyu, & Se Tyan’chen, 2014) was 
introduced into the tax system of the People’s Republic 
of China in 1984. Both business entities and individuals 
dealing with mineral extraction within the territory of the 
country (including the offshore zone of China) pay that 
tax. Initially, resource tax was collected only in case of 
coal, oil, and natural gas extraction. In 1988, the tax 
began to be collected from the iron ore extraction and, 
further, from the extraction of salt, non-ferrous metal 
ores, non-metal ores, rare earth elements etc. Cost (in 
case of oil and natural gas) or amount (for other mine-
rals) is the taxation basis (Kuklina & Gao Tsze, 2005). 
Major share of the resource tax in the PRC is sent to 
regional budgets except the tax receipts from oil and 
natural gas extracted in the offshore zone of China – they 
are sent to the central budget. All the organizations and 
sole proprietors involved in mineral extraction and salt 
production within the territory of China are to pay re-
source tax (Sun’ Yuy, 2010). 
The tax rate is set for the weight/volume of the ex-
tracted minerals; it varies depending upon the type and 
development method (Table 4). 
Table 4. Resource tax rates in the PRC (Tax on the use…, 2019) 
Taxation object Tax rate 
Crude oil 8.0 – 30.0 CNY/t 
Natural gas 2.0 – 15.0 CNY/1000 m3 
Coal 0.3 – 5.0 CNY/t 
Ferrous metal ores  2.0 – 30.0 CNY/t 
Non-ferrous metal ores  0.4 – 30.0 CNY/t 
Other non-metal ores  0.5 – 20.0 CNY/t / 1000 m3 
Hard salt  10.0 – 60.0 CNY/t 
Liquid salt 2.0 – 10.0 CNY/t 
 
In 2010, China initiated reforms in the sphere of min-
ing taxation stipulating gradual refuse to use tax rates 
from the extraction amount and introduction of ad  
valorem rates (ad valorem tax). Since November 1, 2011, 
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ad valorem rates for oil and natural gas extraction has 
been introduced over the whole territory of China along 
with the abolishment of the specific excise collected 
while developing oil within the continental shelf (Shira, 
2016). Within the structure of Chinese tax revenue, re-
source tax accounts for less than 1% being rather low 
index taking into account considerable resource potential 
of the PRC (Zhang, 2014). 
However, Chinese practice as for the resource tax 
distribution to the different-level budgets may be applied 
in Russia. In terms of China, almost all the sum of tax in 
terms of hard minerals and carbohydrates extracted 
within the mainland is sent to regional budgets being 
additional source for territorial development. As for 
Russia, 100% of MET from widespread mineral depos-
its, 100% of MET from diamonds, 60% of MET from 
other types of minerals are sent to regional budgets. At 
the same time, federal budget receives 100% of MET 
from carbohydrates including natural gas and 100% of 
MET from the minerals of Russian continental shelf, 
exclusive economic zone beyond the RF territory. Thus, 
the majority (in money terms) of MET share is sent  
to the federal budget leaving rather small sums of tax 
receipts for the regions. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Comparison of the taxation practices of both deve-
loped and developing countries demonstrates that if in 
the USA tax receipts into regional budgets bypass federal 
center, in case of the developing countries (Mongolia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan) major share of the mineral 
extraction receipts is centralized being distributed imme-
diately from the center. In our opinion, state budget re-
ceipts from the mineral extraction should be sent to the 
local budgets. Finally, financial resources go back to the 
mining regions; however, it is hard to say whether those 
funds correlate to the payments made by the companies 
operating in those regions. Simply stated, there is no 
direct correlation between the payments by a certain 
company into the state budget and final amount of funds 
received by the budget of a region, district or community 
within which territory that company operates. 
Thus, analysis of the international practices to apply a 
mechanism of redistribution of mineral extraction in-
come aimed at the improved social welfare allows dra-
wing certain conclusions. 
There are following principles of the efficiency of the 
system of mineral extraction revenue redistribution: 
specification of the ownership right of all the parties of 
economic relations within the civil (social) form of own-
ership for natural resources; support of the balance in the 
interests of the involved parties along with the prevention 
of domination of certain groups (if necessary, they may 
be even forced to operate for the purpose of social wel-
fare); possibility of social control of the operation of all 
the institutions and elements of the system, access to the 
information on the results of their functioning. 
Appropriate resource-use taxation system is the im-
portant component of the mechanism aimed at provision 
of social welfare as a result of redistribution of the mi-
neral extraction revenues. Establishment of optimal tax 
climate, stimulating the production and maximizing the 
income which share is redistributed in favour of the so-
ciety to cover all the local administration levels, is the 
basic principle of that system. 
Government acts as a leader in the formation of the 
mechanism to distribute mineral extraction revenue. 
Specialized funds are the efficient tool of state policy, 
especially while solving the problem of funds accumula-
tion and efficient administration of the accrued capital 
aimed at social welfare. Their detailed analysis may be 
rather prospective issue for further studies. 
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РОЗПОДІЛ ДОХОДІВ ВІД ВИДОБУТКУ КОРИСНИХ 
КОПАЛИН: ОГЛЯД МІЖНАРОДНОГО ДОСВІДУ 
В. Чурін, Н. Висоцька, Ю. Сізова, О. Даніліна, Д. Горєлов 
Мета. Вивчення основних принципів та умов ефективності системи перерозподілу доходів від видобутку 
корисних копалин, у тому числі в країнах з невисоким рівнем добробуту. 
Методика. У дослідженні використаний метод якісного та кількісного аналізу наукової літератури, даних 
Інституту управління природними ресурсами (Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI)), національних звітів 
за стандартом Ініціативи прозорості видобувних галузей (Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, ІПДО), 
відкритих джерел у мережі Інтернет. Розглядалися режими оподаткування доходів від видобутку корисних 
копалин і найбільш їх важливі тенденції протягом останніх років. Досліджувався розподіл податків на корисні 
копалини за рівнями державного управління, а також вертикального розподілу бюджетних надходжень від при-
родних ресурсів. Як об’єкт дослідження обрані країни, що розподіляють податкові надходження від видобувних 
галузей на користь органів місцевого самоврядування. 
Результати. Встановлено, що для більшості країн платежі від видобутку корисних копалин надходять до ін-
ститутів загальнонаціонального рівня, однак розподіляються назад на місця видобутку або в довколишні райо-
ни. Відзначено, що деякі країни передають частину з доходів від видобувних галузей до місцевих бюджетів 
автоматично, використовуючи формули, що базуються на об’єктивних індикаторах, таких як кількість населен-
ня, обсяги бюджетних надходжень з території, рівень бідності або географічне положення. Виявлено, що основ-
ним принципом системи оподаткування використання ресурсів для забезпечення суспільного добробуту є вста-
новлення оптимального режиму оподаткування, що залишає стимули до виробництва і, в той же час, максимізує 
дохід, частина якого перерозподіляється на користь суспільства між усіма місцевими рівнями управління. 
Наукова новизна полягає у порівняльному аналізі та виявленні особливостей новітніх даних розподілу  
бюджетних надходжень від природних ресурсів на прикладі країн, що розвиваються. 
Практична значимість. Результати можуть сприяти науковому обґрунтуванню стратегії розподілу дохо-
дів від видобутку корисних копалин, плануванню розвитку мінерально-сировинного комплексу країн Серед-
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ньої Азії, а також можуть бути корисними при оцінці ефективності інвестиційних проектів освоєння родовищ 
корисних копалин. 
Ключові слова: корисні копалини, оподаткування, прозорість видобувних галузей, розподіл податків,  
бюджетні надходження 
РАСПРЕДЕЛЕНИЕ ДОХОДОВ ОТ ДОБЫЧИ ПОЛЕЗНЫХ 
ИСКОПАЕМЫХ: ОБЗОР МЕЖДУНАРОДНОГО ОПЫТА 
В. Чурин, Н. Высоцкая, Ю. Сизова, Е. Данилина, Д. Горелов 
Цель. Изучение основных принципов и условий эффективности системы перераспределения доходов от до-
бычи полезных ископаемых, в том числе в странах с невысоким уровнем благосостояния. 
Методика. В исследовании использован метод качественного и количественного анализа научной литерату-
ры, данных Института управления природными ресурсами (Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI)), наци-
ональных отчетов по стандарту Инициативы прозрачности добывающих отраслей (Extractive Industries Trans-
parency Initiative (ИПДО)), открытых источников в сети Интернет. Рассматривались режимы налогообложения 
доходов от добычи полезных ископаемых и наиболее их важные тенденции на протяжении последних лет.  
Исследовалось распределения налогов на полезные ископаемые по уровням государственного управления, а 
также вертикального распределения бюджетных поступлений от природных ресурсов. В качестве объекта ис-
следования выбраны страны, которые распределяют налоговые поступления от добывающих отраслей в пользу 
органов местного самоуправления. 
Результаты. Установлено, что для большинства стран платежи от добычи полезных ископаемых поступают 
в институты общенационального уровня, однако распределяются обратно на места добычи или в близлежащие 
районы. Отмечено, что некоторые страны передают часть с доходов от добывающих отраслей в местные бюд-
жеты автоматически, используя формулы, которые базируются на объективных индикаторах, таких как количе-
ство населения, объемы бюджетных поступлений с территории, уровень бедности или географическое положе-
ние. Выявлено, что основным принципом системы налогообложения использования ресурсов для обеспечения 
общественного благосостояния является установление оптимального режима налогообложения, что оставляет 
стимулы к производству и, в то же время, максимизирует доход, часть которого перераспределяется в пользу 
общества между всеми местными уровнями управления. 
Научная новизна заключается в сравнительном анализе и выявлении особенностей новейших данных рас-
пределения бюджетных поступлений от природных ресурсов на примере развивающихся стран. 
Практическая значимость. Результаты могут способствовать научному обоснованию стратегии распреде-
ления доходов от добычи полезных ископаемых, планированию развития минерально-сырьевого комплекса 
стран Средней Азии, а также могут быть полезны при оценке эффективности инвестиционных проектов освое-
ния месторождений полезных ископаемых. 
Ключевые слова: полезные ископаемые, налогообложение, прозрачность добывающих отраслей, распреде-
ление налогов, бюджетные поступления 
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